‘Second Transition? ‘, core African National Congress (ANC) policy conference document, proclaims that Mangaung ‘must be a turning point away from factionalism and ill-discipline . Because unless we halt [this] decay, we will soon reach a stage where it becomes irreversible’. Denials tint and taint this stern caution. The warning contains refutation that factionalist mobilisation is both continuously and unapologetically practiced in the ANC, circa 2012, and that those issuing the warnings are often perpetrators themselves. Similarly, charges of Ill-discipline have become a treasured tool to suppress opposition from rival factions, provided that the person issuing the charge is an incumbent! There are at least three recent instances that illustrate the advantages of being able to charge opponents inside the ANC with ‘ill-discipline’. An ANC fixation on discipline also finds its way into the policy conference’s Legislature and Governance document. It proposes discipline against ANC members that participate in community protests. The obvious first case of the usefulness of charging ‘ill discipline’ is that of the African National Congress Youth Leagues (ANCYL) and the disciplinary action that was taken against now-disciplined former president Julius Malema. His case carried a touch of ambiguity, given that he had been uttering some outrageous things about the ANC. besides having spoken truths to power.
The exposure around the Malema trial constituted unremitting reminders to others in the ANC of fates that could befall them should they not tow the discipline line.
It did not help Malema’s case that he and his colleagues had decided that their 2007 champion was to be a one-termer as president of the ANC (and South Africa). When Malema’s predecessor, Fikile Mbalula, informed Thabo Mbeki that he would be limited to two terms, Mbeki failed to see the significance of the forewarning. Zuma was not to make the same mistake. The disciplinary process ran its course and is likely to haunt the ANC for some time. The exposure around the Malema trial constituted unremitting reminders to others in the ANC – and especially the ambitious ones – of fates that could befall them should they not tow the discipline line. The timing was fortuitous for the Zuma axis that had their eyes fixed on success in Mangaung. The NEC had issued, and reaffirmed on several occasions, the ruling that there would be no ‘premature’ campaigning for Mangaung ANC positions. Campaigning would only start in October 2012 – the time, actually, when nominations are finalised. The implication is that there will be hardly any campaigning at all, unless it is done by proxy and ‘underground’. Having been complicit and co-responsible for the campaign ban, few ANC seniors, especially not those on the National Executive Committee (NEC), could dare overstep that mark. As disciplined cadres they could certainly also not tell their No. 1 leader that he was on a de facto only-person-campaigning-for-ANC-president mission, having stated his availability before the prematurity ban took effect!
A third instance of charges of ill-discipline as a weapon came with the belated ANC Free State conference last week. Wide-ranging allegations of incumbents’ disregard of branch democracy and the constitution of branches were left largely unattended as a Luthuli House mission, along with Free State pro-Zuma ANC chairperson Ace Magashule, charged ‘ill-discipline’ when the anti-incumbent group stayed away in apparent disillusionment. It is seen as ‘good discipline’ if the missions uphold the wishes of Luthuli House. Operations of the North West ANC are in some respects comparable. The ANC mother body does not regard the defence of incumbents, in the times of high-level 2012 de facto campaigning, as campaigning. Rather, it is projected as ‘the defence of the legitimately elected 2007 leaders’. In this argument, organisational democracy requires members, branches and regions to submit to the incumbents, even if they are ‘running wild’ on the unofficial campaign circuit. Ill-discipline and factionalism are thus so omnipresent, and this has been so continuous especially since the 2005 mobilisation for the Zuma ascendancy project started, that it is possible that there is already no turning back from the two phenomena. It is by all current indications a faction that will win Mangaung, and a faction that will take control of state and government. And, because their position is likely to be so fractious and they feel so insecure, the vicious circle may spin on … unless, the ANC can show statesmanship and propel leaders into office that have the broader interests of the ANC at heart.
– By Analysis: Susan Booysen Professor in the Wits Graduate School of Public & Development Management (P&DM) and author of The ANC and the Regeneration of Political Power
