Leadership developments on day three of the 53rdNational Conference of the African National Congress (ANC) are likely to stand out in ANC history as confirmation of a turning point of note. It was a day of change in the statuses of key figures – and a day when clarity on leadership made place for a barrage of questions.
18 December 2012 started with the expected confirmation that the Motlantheist Forces of Change had been convincingly beaten by the continuity-unity (ontheirterms) Zumaists. Motlanthe’s calm appearance suggested that he had seen this coming. As in the rest of his ‘campaign’ there were no hard words, no explicit and articulated criticisms of the Zuma camp’s de facto scorched earth campaign for Mangaung victory above all.
Future mappers amongst well-placed delegates were happy to share their scenarios of the ANC and ANC government impending events with me – and these continuously changed as the dramatic day unfolded.
Most of the scenarios unfolded around changing occupancy of the deputy presidency of the ANC and through knock-on the deputy presidency of South Africa. Cyril Ramaphosa and Kgalema Motlanthe are the ANC occupants – the new and the just-departed deputy presidents of the ANC. The questions of articulation between the ANC deputy presidency and its presidency, and this hierarchy’s linkage into the presidency of South Africa complicate the mappings. When later this day in a watershed moment Motlanthe declined nomination to the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC) questions about unforeseen changes flooded out the clear alternatives for succession that had rung in the day.
The first point in mapping the road ahead for Kgalema Motlanthe is the apparent willingness of the dominant Zuma faction to show that “Mangaung is not another Polokwane”. Disgruntled ANC members had learnt that there is no credible party political future outside the ANC. The Congress of the People (COPE) was a failure. The newly-disgruntled members have no intention to break.
The acrimony and shock of the Polokwane result, Zumaist elites argue, are not being repeated in the Mangaung mix. Opponents from the Mangaung contest will not be purged from public positions – especially not on the level of the South African deputy president, even if Motlanthe is now occupying the position without his ANC deputy presidency base. The day after ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe would venture: “I don’t think there is any indication, nothing is pointing in that direction at this time” when asked about Motlanthe’s deputy presidency of South Africa also coming to an end.
While jubilant Zumaists on the perimeter of the conference were baying for ‘Motlanthe blood’, the sentiment seemed not to extend into the heart of the ANC’s power hierarchy. And Ramaphosa, seemingly on a political cloud nine, beamed at Zuma’s side.Some conference delegates asserted that Motlanthe may, after all, not have been sacrificed in the battle of the crown princes. They argued that Motlanthe in his ‘campaign’ for the ANC presidency had barely made enemies in the Zuma camp. The camp was peeved, and some were seriously angered, by the fact that Motlanthe would not cede ‘uncontested re-elected as president’ space to Zuma. Yet, they conceded that Motlanthe had not directly criticised Jacob Zuma. He played the loyal and disciplined cadre role. The ANC came first.
Several of the delegates in conversation repeated the argument – Zuma is 70, basically tired and personally ready for retirement (to Nkandla, they say). He is just not fired up to tackle South Africa’s vexing policy and governance issues with a new gusto, they argued. Their line of thinking was that Motlanthe may remain the most serious contender to be the face of the ANC’s 2014 election campaign – and hence the ANC’s number one on the proportional representation list and designated president of South Africa.
This would pitch Motlanthe directly against Ramaphosa as contender for the top position. The ANC has in its internal processes of most of the past decade and a half followed the ‘rule’ that the deputy president of the ANC advances into the ANC presidency and subsequently into the South African presidency.
The Zumaists in the mid-afternoon conversations argued, however, that Ramaphosa would be a insufficiently qualified president of South Africa should he step into the presidency come 2014 (of South Africa, and while Zuma probably retains the ANC presidency) after having been out of mainstream government politics and government management for over a decade. Motlanthe, however, would fit the bill, subject of course to Zuma’s continuous presidential tutelage of the ANC! Reconciliation ruled: the Zumaist ANC would embrace the electoral loser. Ramaphosa would then be ready to step in as Motlanthe’s successor as the next, post-Zuma-post-Motlanthe president of South Africa.
The immediate and obvious alternative would be that Ramaphosa would slip into the ANC presidency in another five years’ time and roughly eighteen months after then in 2019 become Zuma’s successor as president of South Africa. Shouldthis scenarioplay out, Zuma would then be edging toward 80 years of age.
The arguments for an early Zuma exit rhyme with recent reports from Luthuli House (in my own research interviews) that plans are afoot to push for an early Zuma exit. These voices had labelled Mangaung (and their/the need to get Zuma’s re-election over and done with andthenmove on) as Round One. Round Two – after having demonstrated loyalty and respect towards Zuma – would be to ensure a smooth (and respectful) exit and a credible successor.
Zuma spoke conciliatory words to the Mangaung delegates minutes after affirmation of his Mangaung re-election, pleading for unity and tolerance. Yet, lingering bitterness about a rough and often-compromised Mangaung election campaign to secure victory, at virtually all cost, may obstruct post-Mangaung unity. Outside the conference tent victorious Zumaists proclaimed that ANC members desperate for fair internal electoral processes were regarded as ‘no longer in the ANC’ … “What is the need for reconciliation?” they wanted to know.
Fragile as this situation was, late afternoon brought an unexpected turn. Motlanthe turned down nomination for membership of the NEC. The previous scenarios faded. Ramaphosa was now the crown prince and in the pound seats. But an essential pillar of backup to stablilise the Zuma government and get a gradual post-Mangaung succession had been pulled.
Those in the know asserted that the relationship between Motlanthe and Zuma had in fact broken down to such an extent that Motlanthe could not “work with Zuma ten more minutes”. Persons close to Ramaphosa beamed that of course their man is ready for the job, of course he wants it, of course this intensely private person will cope with nasty exposés on skeletons in the cupboard when they come.
By nightfall the stark reality was etched out on the template of the Mangaung conference: a thoroughly new generation, fully post-liberation ANC, double in (frequently unruly) number of members, with meek on-the-ground prospects for unity and post-Mangaung reconciliation has taken control. Many of the liberation leaders, both inziles and exiles, were around but sometimes seem displaced into foreign new territory. In addition, there was notice of a possible leadership vacuum – the party was led by a president who was questioned even by some of his closest supporters. They planned his retirement. The line of succession was suddenly veiled in questions with uncertain answers. The conference delegates rang in the life of a new party. Alternatively, the battle was on for the ‘real ANC’ to reclaim control.
Graduate School of Public and Development Management, Wits University
– By OPINION: Political Analyst Susan Booysen
