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ECAAR Allegations
(Economists Allied
for Arms Reduction) ECAAR's spokesperson, Terry Crawford-Browne,
has made some dramatic claims regarding the deal, which he says
comes from information gathered by ANC intelligence operatives
who were instructed to look into the deal by the ANC
whistleblowers.
These include
allegations that:
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Former Defence
Minster, Joe Modise, took a payment of R10 million for
setting up the German submarine contracts
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Links between
the awarding of the Cell C contract and the arms deal
through Shamin "Chippy" Shaik whose brother,
Younis is head of the Cell C consortium and new-generation
electronics and smart-card technology which amounts to a
conflict of interest.
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It is alleged
that the Cell C award was in reciprocity for Saudi Arabian
contributions to ANC campaign funding
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Links through
the Chairman of Cell C's holding company, Lt Gen Lambert
Moloi to Modise (his brother-in-law) to Denel and to
Futuristic Business Solutions, one of the prime co-ordinators
of the Arms Aquisition Programme
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Involvement of
shady characters such as Marc Rich, the American financial
fugitive in Switzerland who was one of the leading
oil-sanctions busters during the apartheid era; as well as
to Special Branch Colonel Alf Oosthuizen who was a
perpetrator of apartheid-era atrocities
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Allegations that
the German sub-marine contracts were central to the Coega
Project near Port Elizabeth and is merely a white elephant
comparable to Mossgas.
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Pres Mbeki
himself is applying massive political pressure to close down
the Heath Unit because it has uncovered corruption involving
government ministers and his own brother, Moeletsi Mbeki.
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That the present
personnel within the SANDF don't have the skills or
knowledge to operate the technology being bought
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That the
proposed Conventional
Arms Control Bill
which has been revoked by parliament was an attempt to
provide the State with indemnity against having to disclose
any criminal activity by prohibiting public disclosure of
allegations such as those made by Patricia de Lille and
ECAAR. This would have invoked a culture of secrecy
similar to that of the apartheid era, removing all
transparency and accountability to the public or to fellow
ministers.There is every indication that the government will
try to reintroduce the Bill for tabling again next year
Is the Arms
Package a good deal or Not???
In an effort to find
out if the Arms procurement package was a good deal or not, we
asked defence expert Mr. Helmut Rohmer-Heitman for his
assessment of the deal. The SABC asked him to comment on to the
following claims:
As you know the South African
government is willing to pay SEK 15 billion for 28 JAS-39
Gripen fighters. Each plane will cost South Africa SEK 535
million.
We have received information from a source questioning the
high price, informing us that SAAB's promotion of the JAS-39
Gripen to Brazil has been to a price of SEK 180 million, to
Chile SEK 285 million and to the Philippines SEK 280 million
for each plane.
The offer to Brazil has been for about 100 planes, to Chile
16-20 planes and the offer to the Philippines has been for 20+
planes.
The difference is substantial. Why should South Africa pay SEK
255 million more than the Philippines for each plane?
Mr.
Heitman, a correspondent for the Janes defence Weekly
publication, referred to claims made by Mr. Terry Crawford
Browne and sent us the following response:
I speak - write! - under
correction, but I do not think that any hard offer has been
made to Brazil, Chile or the Phillipines. I do not know
where Mr Crawford-Browne claims to get his information, but
it seems suspect.
That said, three points:
1. There is a vast
difference between the so-called "fly away" price
of an aircraft on the one hand, and a package cost. The
former is the aircraft "as is", with no spare
engines or other spares, no engine test beds or
avionics test benches, no specialised ground support
equipment, no pilot training simulators, no pilot
training and no ground crew and technical personnel
training, and no support to the local industry to prepare to
support the aircraft through a service life of 20 to 30
years. The latter will include all of those things. The
difference can be as much as 100% or even more in some
cases. The figures that Crawford-Browne mentions in respect
of Chile and the Philippines may have been based on a quoted
"fly away" cost estimate. The actual contract
price would be very much higher. The figure quoted by him in
respect of Brazil is too low to even be credible as a
fly away cost - unless it was a quote at "fly
away" cost for a bare aircraft without the multi-mode
radar, the navigation/attack system, the communications
system and the electronic warfare system. That would imply
that Brazil would be fitting systems acquired from other
manufacturers to their aircraft. The final cost of the
aircraft in service would then be a lot more than South
Africa is paying because of the additional design and
integration costs. The bottom line is that one must compare
package cost with package cost or fly away price with fly
away price. Even then one must know exactly what is in the
package and what the basic fly away configuration is (see
below).
2. Two apparently
similar or even apparently identical aircraft can have very
different price tags depending on the model of the engine
that is fitted, the type of radar (eg full multi-mode or a
simpler system), the navigation/attack system (eg day only
or day and night capable), the electronic countermeasures
system, etc. It is impossible to make any real comparison
without knowing exactly what the aircraft's systems
comprise.
3. Having just said
that comparisons are very difficult to make, I will now go
ahead and make one, albeit in the full knowledge that it is
simplistic: Assuming Crawford-Browne's figure of SEK 15
billion is correct, South Africa is paying about US$ 57.6 million
per aircraft for the total package. The United Arab Emirates
has recently signed a contract for 80 F-16 Block 60s at a price
of $ 80 million each. To be fair, that includes some
missiles, so one should probably cut that down to $ 70
million each. The F-16 is a bigger aircraft, but its
is also much older in concept and technology, development
having started in 1968 and the first aircraft flying in
1974. The first Gripen flew in 1988. The F-16 is also much
more difficult and expensive to maintain and less suited to
dispersed operations from "austere" airfields,
which is something the SAAF's fighters are very likely to
have to do if South Africa becomes involved in regional
security.
The bottom line is that I
believe South Africa is getting a good aircraft at a
very good price. For my part I would have preferred a larger
twin-engine fighter, but that would have taken the cost to
over $ 100 million each - a bit outside what the pocket can
handle!
A long
answer to a simple question, but I hope it is of use.
To expand on this a bit:
South Africa is paying just a little more for four patrol
corvettes than the Indian Navy has just paid for one
slightly better armed frigate, and is paying less for its
ships than Malaysia paid for smaller light frigates that are
not as well equipped. The submarines and Hawks are coming in
at roughly market prices. I could not evaluate the A-109
price because there have been no recent sales of twin-engine
military-standard light utility helicopters. The Lynx offer
for the shipborne helicopter is somewhat better than the
price obtained by New Zealand for the similar American
Seasprite.
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To: Patricia de Lille, MP - from: Terry
Crawford-Browne
Sweden's involvement in the R43 billion arms
acquisition programme:
The South African government announced in November 1998 that
it intended to purchase 28 BAe/Saab JAS39 Gripen fighter
aircraft from Sweden at a cost of R10.875 billion, ie R388
million (about US$65 million) per plane. BAe has a 35 percent in
the Saab Gripen
because the Swedish armaments industry is no longer
economically viable, and the Swedes are trying to spread some of
the costs.
The JAS 39 Gripen has been a financial disaster and political
embarrassment. Costs have been way, way over budget at about SEK
60 billion (R46 billion), and the Swedish government is
desperately trying to export the plane to countries such as
Finland, Chile, Brazil, Philippines and South Africa. Only South
Africa has agreed to buy the Gripen which is designed for Arctic
conditions, not Africa. Aviation specialists say it would be
quite useless in Southern Africa because of its short range.
Big business based around the Wallenberg family (which
dominates Sweden's economy the way the Oppenheimers used to
"own" South Africa) has pressured Prime Minister Goran
Persson's government to market the Gripen. Persson's government
is shaky and cannot afford to defy the Wallenbergs.
The Minister of Defence, von Sydow, visited South Africa in
June 1998 to market the Gripen. The Parliamentary Monitoring
Group asked me to attend a parliamentary breakfast hosted by
Tony Yengeni. Yengeni was not pleased by my presence. Anyway,
his question to von Sydow regarding the generosity of the
offsets was very plain. His body language was "how big are
the bribes?" Von Sydow replied that the decision was not
his to make, but that he had got the message and would take it
back to Sweden.
That was the first time that I met Roger Hallhag who is now
the Swedish Prime Minister's Special Advisor on International
Affairs. (He, you'll remember, was the Swedish representative at
the conference at the Centre for the Book in November 1999).
Archbishop Tutu had been invited by Swedish church NGOs to speak
at a conference in Stockholm a week later in June 1998. He
couldn't go, and sent me to make a 15 minute speech. Hallhag was
the government's representative also on that occasion.
About 150 academics, politicians and theologians were
present, and the conference received excellent radio coverage. I
thanked Swedes for their support in the struggle against
apartheid, but said Sweden should not now contradict that record
by selling weapons to a country that faces urgent crises of
poverty but no foreign military threat.
The Swedes like to think that they are squeaky clean, so I
also briefly mentioned the Bofors scandal in India of the 1980s
which brought down the Gandhi government. The media took over
after that, and grilled their politicians about the immorality
of selling armaments to countries such as South Africa. When I
got back the Swedish Ambassador personally complained to
Archbishop Tutu, but he had approved my speech before I left!
A one hour Swedish TV documentary followed in which Helmut-Romer
Heitman confirmed that the offsets were actually more important
that the equipment itself. Ron Haywood of Armscor and Ronnie
Kasrils repeated this, Haywood saying what businessman could
pass up on such as deal -- you pay R1 and get R4 back!
In terms of the Gripen deal, the offsets were touted by our
government as being worth R48.313 billion and would create 23
195 jobs. Swedish business newspapers started querying whether
Swedish taxpayers weren't being fleeced yet again. A Saab
executive was quoted as saying that the South Africans (Jayendra
Naidoo) were lost in the maze of their own figures. The Swedish
archbishop threatened to sell church investments in any
companies that participated in the offset programmes.
Then there were the Numsa allegations of funds being routed
by BAe through two Swedish trade unions to buy Numsa's support
of the arms package. The Auditor General's report refers to the
tender specifications being altered in order to favour BAe over
the Italians. It is BAe which is "driving" the
acquisitions programme including the proposed privatisation of
Denel, and Sweden has been sucked by BAe.
Because of the development overruns, the Gripen is already
more expensive than the American F16 which costs about US$25
million per plane. Add the costs of offsets, and South Africa is
being charged US$65 million per plane.
The attached email from Kristna Fredsrorelsen, Stockholm says
that South Africa is being fleeced compared with quotes to
Chile, Brazil and the Philippines.
The GCIS release in September 1999 listed 21 possible Swedish
offset programmes. The details were extremely sketchy, but
several of them appeared to have been linked to Billy
Rautenbach's Wheels For Africa Group which held the franchises
for Volvo and Saab in Africa south of the equator. Rautenbach
has since gone bankrupt, is wanted for murder, and is alleged to
be the financial brains behind Robert Mugabe's misadventures in
the Democratic Republic of Congo.
The normal commercial recourse for contracts which have been
tainted by corruption is cancellation. Should the Minister of
Finance repudiate the SA government guarantees, the deals would
collapse without cost to South Africa.
Terry Crawford-Browne (Economists
Allied for Arms Reduction)
January 11, 2001
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